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Quantum mechanics is undoubtedly the most successful theory yet devised by the human
mind. Not one of the multitude of its calculated predictions has ever been found wanting, even
in the last measured decimal place—nor is there any reason to believe that this will change
in the foreseeable future. All the same, it is a bizarre theory. Let us quote Feynman [1], one
of the deepest scientist-thinkers of our century and one not known for his intellectual (or any
other) modesty, on the subject: “There was a time when the newspapers said that only twelve
men understood the theory of relativity. I do not believe there ever was such a time. There
might have been a time when only one man did, because he was the only guy who caught on,
before he wrote his paper. But after people read the paper a lot of people understood the
theory of relativity in some way or other, certainly more than twelve. On the other hand, I
think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics. ... I am going to tell you
what nature behaves like. If you will simply admit that maybe she does behave like this, you
will find her a delightful, entrancing thing. Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possibly
avoid it, ‘but how can it be like that?’ because you will get ‘down the drain,’ into a blind alley
from which nobody has yet escaped. Nobody knows how it can be like that.”
Feynman’s point of view, expressed as usual with great vigor and clarity, characterizes the
attitude of most physicists towards the foundations of quantum mechanics, a subject concerned
with the meaning and interpretation of quantum theory—at least it did so before the work
of Bell [2] and the experiments of Aspect et al. [[3]:b] (which came after the cited Feynman
lecture). Even today, the subject is treated like a poor stepchild of the physics family. It is
pretty much ignored in most standard graduate texts, and what is conveyed there is often so
mired in misconception and confusion that it usually does more harm than good. To many
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physicists it appears that not only does foundational research not lead to genuine scientific
progress, but that it is in fact dangerous, with the potential for getting people “down the
drain.” Even to the more tolerant ones it often seems that what is achieved merely supports
what every good physicist should have known already.
While these perceptions are partly true, they are also in part misapprehensions arising
from the, to our taste, much too practical approach taken by many physicists. Basic questions
concerning the physical meaning of quantities, such as the wave function, which we manipulate
in our computations are too important to be left to philosophers. One such question, whether
the description of a physical system provided by its wave function is complete, is central to
the articles reprinted in this section. [We refer to papers in this book by [ :b] and to papers
on the CD-ROM by [ :c].]
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) [[4]:b] argue that quantum mechanics provides at
best an incomplete description of physical reality. Indeed, they claim that there are situations
in which the very predictions of quantum theory demand that there be elements of physi-
cal reality—i.e., predetermined, preexisting values for physical quantities, which are revealed
rather than created if and when we measure those quantities—that are not incorporated within
the orthodox quantum framework. In the original version of the argument, these elements of
reality are the (simultaneous) values of the position and momentum of a particle belonging
to an EPR pair—a pair of particles whose quantum state, given by the EPR wave function,
involves such strong quantum pair correlations that the position or momentum of one of the
particles can be inferred from the measurement of that of the other. By the uncertainty prin-
ciple, however, the position and momentum of one particle cannot simultaneously be part of
the quantum description. In the later version of the EPR analysis due to Bohm [5], which
provides the framework for most of the experimental tests of quantum theory that were stimu-
lated by the celebrated Bell’s inequality paper [2], these elements of reality are the values of the
(simultaneous) components, in all possible directions, of the spins of the particles belonging
to a Bohm-EPR pair—a pair of spin 1/2 particles prepared in the singlet S = 0 state—or,
in another version, the simultaneous components of photon polarization in a suitable photon
pair. We shall call these the Bohm-EPR elements of reality. (They again cannot simultane-
ously be part of the quantum description because spin components in different directions do
not commute.)
The EPR analysis begins with a criterion of reality: “If, without in any way disturbing a
system, we can predict with certainty ... the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an
element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.” EPR continue, “It seems
to us that this criterion, while far from exhausting all possible ways of recognizing a physical
reality, at least provides us with one such way .... Regarded not as a necessary, but merely as a
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sufficient, condition of reality, this criterion is in agreement with classical as well as quantum-
mechanical ideas of reality.” They then deduce the existence of the relevant elements of reality
for an EPR pair from the predictions of quantum theory for the pair. In so doing, however,
they crucially require a locality assumption, that “the process of measurement carried out on
the first system ... does not disturb the second system in any way.” EPR conclude as follows:
“While we have thus shown that the wave function does not provide a complete description of
the physical reality, we left open the question of whether or not such a description exists. We
believe, however, that such a theory is possible.”
We wish to emphasize that in arguing here for the incompleteness of the quantum de-
scription, EPR were not questioning the validity of the experimental predictions of quantum
theory. On the contrary, they were claiming that these predictions were not only compatible
with a more complete description—in particular, one involving their elements of reality—but
also demanded one. Elsewhere, Einstein [6] asserts that in “a complete physical description,
the statistical quantum theory would ... take an approximately analogous position to the
statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics.”
Niels Bohr [[7]:b], in what is perhaps the definitive statement of his principle of complemen-
tarity, disagreed with the EPR conclusion, though he did not take the EPR analysis lightly.
The central objection in Bohr’s reply is that the EPR reality criterion “contains an ambigu-
ity as regards the meaning of the expression ‘without in any way disturbing a system.’ Of
course, there is ... no question of a mechanical disturbance .... But ... there is essentially the
question of an influence on the very conditions which ... constitute an inherent element of the
description of any phenomenon to which the term ‘physical reality’ can be properly attached
....” While, with Bell [8], we “have very little idea what this means,” it does perhaps suggest
“the feature of wholeness typical of proper quantum phenomena” elsewhere stressed by Bohr
[9].
Bohm [[10]:b], [[11]:c], on the other hand, not only agreed with EPR that the quan-
tum description is incomplete, but showed explicitly how to extend the incomplete quantum
description—by the introduction of “hidden variables”—into a complete one, in such a way
that the indeterminism of quantum theory is completely eliminated. We shall call Bohm’s
deterministic completion of nonrelativistic quantum theory Bohmian mechanics. In Bohmian
mechanics the “hidden variables” are simply the positions of the particles, which move, un-
der an evolution governed by the wave function, in what is in effect the simplest possible
manner [12]. We should emphasize that Bohmian mechanics is indeed an extension of quan-
tum theory, in the sense that in this theory, as in quantum theory, the wave function evolves
autonomously according to Schro¨dinger’s equation. Moreover, it can be shown [12] that the
statistical description in quantum theory, given by ρ = |ψ|2, indeed takes, as Einstein wanted,
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“an approximately analogous position to the statistical mechanics within the framework of
classical mechanics.”
Bohmian mechanics was ignored by most physicists, but it was taken very seriously by
Bell, who declared [13] that “in 1952 I saw the impossible done.” Bell quite naturally asked
how Bohm had managed to do what von Neumann [14] had proclaimed to be—and almost
all authorities agreed was—impossible. (It is perhaps worth noting that despite the almost
universal acceptance among physicists of the soundness of von Neumann’s proof of the im-
possibility of hidden variables, undoubtedly based in part on von Neumann’s well-deserved
reputation as one of the greatest mathematicians of the twentieth century, Bell [15] felt that
the assumptions made by von Neumann about the requirements for a hidden-variable theory
are so unreasonable that “the proof of von Neumann is not merely false but foolish!” See
also Ref. 16.) His ensuing hidden-variables analysis led to Bell’s inequality, which must be
satisfied by certain correlations between Bohm-EPR elements of reality—and, of course, by
correlations between their measured values. He observed also that quantum theory predicts a
sharp violation of the inequality when the quantities in question are measured.
Thus the specific elements of reality to which the EPR analysis would lead (if applied to the
Bohm-EPR version) must satisfy correlations that are incompatible with those given by quan-
tum theory. That is, these elements of reality, whatever else they may be, are demonstrably
incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory and hence are certainly not part of any
completion of it. It follows that there is definitely something wrong with the EPR analysis,
since quantum mechanics cannot be (even partially) completed in the manner demanded by
this analysis. In other words, had EPR been aware of the work of Bell, they might well have
predicted that quantum theory is wrong and proposed an experimental test of Bell’s inequality
to settle the issue once and for all.
Of course, EPR were not aware of Bell’s analysis, but Clauser, Horne, Shimony, and Holt
were [[17]:c]. Their proposal for an experimental test has led to an enormous proliferation of
experiments, the most conclusive of which was perhaps that of Aspect et al. [[3]:b] included
here. The result: Quantum mechanics is right.
We note, however, that the predictions of (nonrelativistic) quantum mechanics—in partic-
ular, those for the experimental tests of Bell’s inequality—are in complete agreement with the
predictions of Bohmian mechanics. Thus the Bohm-EPR elements of reality are not part of
Bohmian mechanics! This is because in Bohmian mechanics the result of what we speak of as
measuring a spin component depends as much upon the detailed experimental arrangement
for performing the measurement as it does upon anything existing prior to and independent of
the measurement. This dependence is an example of what the experts in the hidden-variables
field call contextuality [18], (see also Ref. 15) i.e., of the critical importance of not overlooking
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“the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under
which the phenomena appear”[19].
In fact, just before he arrived at his inequality, Bell noticed that “in this [Bohm’s] theory
an explicit causal mechanism exists whereby the disposition of one piece of apparatus affects
the results obtained with a distant piece. ... Bohm of course was well aware of these features
of his scheme, and has given them much attention. However, it must be stressed that, to the
present writer’s knowledge, there is no proof that any hidden variable account of quantum
mechanics must have this extraordinary character. It would therefore be interesting, perhaps,
to pursue some further ‘impossibility proofs,’ replacing the arbitrary axioms objected to above
by some condition of locality, or of separability of distant systems”[18]. Almost immediately,
Bell found his inequality. Thus did Bohmian mechanics lead to Bell’s refutation of the EPR
claim to have “shown that the wave function does not provide a complete description.” At
the same time it showed, by explicit example, the correctness of the EPR belief “that such a
theory is possible”!
While Bell’s analysis, together with the results of experiments such as Aspect’s, implies
that the EPR analysis was faulty, where in fact did EPR go wrong? Since their only genuine
assumption was that of locality quoted above, and since their subsequent reasoning is valid,
it is this assumption that must fail, both for quantum theory and for nature herself. Aspect’s
experiment thus establishes perhaps the most striking implication of quantum theory: Nature
is nonlocal! This conclusion is of course implicit in the very structure of quantum theory
itself, based as it is on a field—the wave function—which for a many-body system lives not
on physical space but on a 3n-dimensional configuration space, a structure that allows for the
entanglement of states of distant systems—as most dramatically realized in the EPR state
itself. But while quantum mechanics may someday be replaced by a theory of an entirely
different character, we may nonetheless conclude—though there are some who disagree [15]—
from Bell and Aspect that the nonlocality it implies is here to stay.
One of the great foundational mysteries that remains very much unsolved is how nonlocality
can be rendered compatible with special relativity, i.e., with Lorentz invariance. Here Bohmian
mechanics is of no direct help, since it manifestly and fundamentally is not Lorentz invariant.
But there is no reason to believe that a more appropriate completion of quantum theory, one
that is Lorentz invariant and perhaps even generally covariant, cannot be found. However, one
should not expect finding it to be easy.
One lesson of this story is perhaps that we would be wise to place greater trust in the math-
ematical structure of quantum theory, and less in the philosophy with which quantum theory
is so often encumbered. For the EPR problem, the mathematical structure correctly suggests
nonlocality, while the philosophy makes the questionable demand that the wave function pro-
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vide a complete description, at least on the microscopic level. The paper [[20]:b] by Aharonov
and Bohm included here supports this lesson. Aharonov and Bohm dramatically demonstrate
that the electromagnetic vector potential has a reality in quantum theory far beyond what it
has classically: a nonvanishing vector potential may generate a shift in an interference pattern
for an electron confined to a region in which the magnetic field itself vanishes. The Aharonov-
Bohm effect, while rather clear from the role played by the vector potential in Schro¨dinger’s
equation, is rather surprising from the perspective of the usual quantum philosophy, which,
in attempting to explain quantum deviations from classical behavior, appeals to limitations
on what can be measured or known arising from disturbances occurring during the act of
measurement that are due to the finiteness of the quantum of action.
It is appropriate to mention at this time—even though it is not the focus of any of the
five papers included in this chapter—one of the strongest arguments for the conclusion that
the quantum mechanical description is incomplete: the notorious measurement problem—or,
what amounts to the same thing, the paradox of Schro¨dinger’s cat. The problem is that
the after-measurement wave function for system and apparatus arising from Schro¨dinger’s
equation for the composite system typically involves a superposition over terms corresponding
to what we would like to regard as the various possible results of the measurement—e.g.,
different pointer orientations. Since it seems rather important that the actual result of the
measurement be a part of the description of the after-measurement situation, it is difficult to
see how this wave function could be the complete description of this situation. By contrast,
with a theory or interpretation in which the description of the after-measurement situation
includes, in addition to the wave function, at least the values of the variables that register the
result, the measurement problem vanishes. (The remaining problem of then justifying the use
of the “collapsed” wave function—corresponding to the actual result—in place of the original
one is often confused with the measurement problem. The justification for this replacement
is nowadays frequently expressed in terms of decoherence. One of the best descriptions of
the mechanisms of decoherence, though not the word itself, can be found in the Bohm article
reprinted here; see also Ref. 5. We wish to emphasize, however, as did Bell in his article
“Against Measurement” [21], that decoherence per se in no way comes to grips with the
measurement problem itself.)
The orthodox response to the measurement problem is that we must distinguish between
closed systems and open systems—those upon which an external “observer” intervenes. While
we do not want to delve into the merits of this response here—nor is this the place to discuss the
sundry proposals for alternate interpretations of quantum theory, such as those of Schulman
[22] and of Pearle [[23]:c], [24] and Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber [25], [26]—we do wish to note
one particular difficulty, much emphasized of late. This concerns the now-popular subject of
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quantum cosmology, concerned with the physics of the universe as a whole, certainly a closed
system! A formulation of quantum mechanics that makes sense for closed systems seems to be
demanded. Bohmian mechanics is one such formulation. Others also now generating a good
deal of excitement are due to Griffiths [27], Omne`s [28], and Gell-Mann and Hartle [29]. All
of these exemplify the EPR conclusion “that the wave function does not provide a complete
description of the physical reality.”
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